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WHITHER ENVIRONMENTALISM?
THE FUTURE POLITICAL PATH OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT*
FREDERICK H. BUTTEL and OSCAR W.LARSON III**
INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to explore the issue of "whither environmentalism?" along a plane far different from that occupied by persons
presently debating the question of the viability of environmentalism
as a major social force. 1 The focus of the remarks that follow will be
on the possible characteristics of, and social forces that might lead
to, the institutionalization of varying forms of environmentalism in
the United States and other advanced societies. The article argues
that the possible forms of environmentalism can be adequately
described in terms of the notions of "left, right, and center"categories we use in preference to those of "socialist, conservative,
and liberal" used by Stretton in a recent book that makes an argument parallel to ours.2
The principal assumption of this paper is that the form that environmentalism takes-that is, the organization, social bases, ideology,
and tactics of the environmental movement in relation to state
structure-is extremely important and will substantially shape the
impact of environmental reform on different sectors of the society
and society as a whole. This assumption is predicated on Stretton's
observation that the "successful" implementation of environmental
policy-or, in other words, the transition to a steady-state or "sustainable" economy-may take a variety of political routes. Stretton
contends that resource scarcity probably will unleash a new set of
socio-economic forces that lead to a variety of types of state struc*This is a revised and expanded version of comments presented at a panel discussion at
the annual meeting of the Rural Sociological Society, San Francisco, California, September
1978. We greatly appreciate the useful comments Robert Mitchell and Denton Morrison
have made on previous drafts of this paper.
**Assistant Professor and Research Assistant, respectively, Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell University.
1. Important explorations of this issue include Downs, Up and Down with Ecology- The
"Issue-Attention Cycle," 28 PUBLIC INTEREST 38 (1972); Dunlap & Dillman, Decline in
Public Support for Environmental Protection: Evidence from a 1970-1974 Panel Study, 41
RURAL SOC. 382 (1976); K. E. Hornback, Orbits of Opinion: The Role of Age in the
Environmental Movement's Attentive Public, 1968-1972 (unpublished thesis, Michigan State
University 1974); Mitchell, The Public Speaks Again: A New Environmental Survey, 60
RESOURCES 1 (1978).
2. H. STRETTON, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1976).
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tures. As the customary political relationships between classes and
groups forged in eras of resource abundance fail to deal with resource
scarcity, these classes and groups struggle over how their interests can
be met most fully under these new circumstances.
However, Stretton's otherwise useful book provides little insight
into how existing social forces might lead to each of the three forms
of environmentalism he describes. This paper thus is concerned with
developing notes toward a theory of the prospective origins of environmentalism of the left, right, and center.
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTALISM
There has been a strong tendency for social scientists to adopt an
overly restricted definition of environmentalism-one confined to
descriptions of the voluntary organizations involved in the environmental movement. This view limits one's ability to specify the role of
environmental politics and conflict in future social change. To avoid
this and other difficulties associated with defining environmentalism
too narrowly, we consider the term to have an essential three-fold
character.
The first component of environmentalism is public environmentalism-public preferences for healthier, aesthetically pleasing, ecologically harmonious residential, work, and recreational surroundings.
Public environmentalism thus is distinct analytically from (although
in practice clearly affected by) organized or voluntary environmentalism, which we define in terms of the structure, ideology, and
tactics of prominent voluntary groups (e.g., the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, or the Environmental Defense Fund). While organized
environmentalism can and must draw strength from broad-based public environmentalism and seek support for its demands by claiming to
represent widely held public opinions, in reality often there is little
correspondence between these two components of environmentalism. For example, organized environmentalism has been heavily involved in the effort to preserve remote areas, while the majority of
"public environmentalists" live and work in, and hence tend to be
concerned with, improving conditions in their largely urban environments.
The final element of the three-fold character of environmentalism
is that which Morrison 3 has referred to as "institutional environmen3. Morrison, Hornback & Warner, The Environmental Movement: Some Preliminary
Observations and Predictions, in SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 259 (W. Burch, -Cheek & -Taylor eds. 1972); Morrison, The
Environmental Movement: Conflict Dynamics, 2 J. VOLUNTARY ACT. RESEARCH 74
(1973).
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tal movement organizations"-that is, public bureaucracies which
have jurisdiction over environmental or environmentally related social
policy (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency, National Park
Service, Bureau of Land Management, Department of Energy). Institutional environmentalism's distinctive feature is that it is part of the
state; advocacy of environmental protection by a government agency
must be tempered somewhat because of the many constraints on
government action. For instance, the ability of the Environmental
Protection Agency to curb air or water pollution is constrained by
the policies of other agencies concerned with economic growth, foreign policy, employment, inflation, or energy availability. 4
Recognizing the tripartite nature of environmentalism has several
advantages for placing the "whither environmentalism" question in
broader perspective. The first is that it demonstrates that the structure of environmentalism-that is, the relationships between and the
prominence or subordination manifest by its components-may exhibit important variations.
Second, the tactics and ideology of organized environmentalism
can be seen as a product of the interaction between the class composition and interests of organized environmentalists on one hand,
and the structure of government power on the other. For instance,
the structural fusion and ideological correspondence between major
corporate elites and state officials in Japan has yielded a relatively
"closed" decision-making structure, impervious to the demands of
interest groups whose goals do not coincide with the rapid growth
policies of the Japanese government.5 Therefore, voluntary environmental groups are less prominent in Japan than in the more pluralistic government structure of the United States. In the face of massive environmental damage deriving from rapid economic growth,
public environmentalism in Japan has become substantially more
mobilized than in the United States. This has led to often violent
conflicts because of the inability of public interest groups to have an
impact on Japanese state policy. 6 In addition, Japanese environmentalism appears to be far more attuned to issues of direct interest to
the urban working class and less preoccupied with rural land use
4. W. A. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN ch. 3 (2d
ed. 1977); A. Schnaiberg and E. Meidinger, Social Reality vs. Analytic Mythology: Social
Impact Assessment of Natural Resource Utilization (1978) (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Sociological Association),
5. Kelley, Stunkel & Wescott, The Politics of the Environment: The United States,
USSR, and Japan, in THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (L. Milbrath and F.
lnscho eds. 1975).
6. Id.; Geisler, ExportingPollution: The Case of Japan, 8 WEST. SOC. REV. 1 (1977).
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issues, which are of principal concern to the American environmental
movement.
THE NATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUENCY IN THE 1970s
Consistent with the parochial definition of environmentalism prevalent in United States social science, there is a tendency to conceive
of environmentalism as a largely unchanging, monolithic entity. This
conception assumes that environmentalists will continue to be drawn
from particular social classes or strata (principally the "upper-middle
class" engaged in noncorporate employment). 7 However, since the
benefits secured by environmentalists are distributed so broadly,
environmentalism has no natural constituency among enduring social
categories. Instead, the rooting of environmental concerns in key
production and consumption institutions, especially in terms of the
ways that environmental controls would affect various groups of
producing organizations and consumers, dictates that various groups
will adopt an array of environmentally related interests and ideologies.
Continued observation of environmentalism and careful empirical
studies have established the moderate-liberal posture of environmentalists and their supporters in legislative bodies during the 1970s. For
instance, support for environmental agendas in legislatures came from
Democrats far more often than from Republicans,' while environmental activists and sympathizers tended to be Democratic Party
identifiers and political liberals.9 The ideological character of contemporary environmentalism thus closely corresponds to the ideological predilections of the noncorporate middle class, the major
support base of organized environmentalism. The apparent moderateliberal political moorings of environmentalism during the past decade
also seem due to the fact that its reform strategy largely has involved
prompting the state to regulate private decision-making more closely
-a position clearly in the liberal tradition of American politics.
7. See especially, R. E. Dunlap, The Socioeconomic Basis of the Environmental Movement: Old Data, New Data, and Implications for the Movement's Future (1975) (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association. However, here as
well as in the remaining portions of the paper, we do not wish to imply that these strata are
uniformly pro-environmental.
8. Dunlap & Gale, Party Membership and EnvironmentalPolitics:A Legislative Roll-Call
Analysis, 55 SOC. SCI. Q. 670 (1974); Dunlap & Allen, Partisan Differences on EnvironmentalIssues: A CongressionalRoll-CallAnalysis, 29 WEST. POL. Q. 384 (1976).
9. Buttel & Flinn, Environmental Politics: The Structuring of Partisan and Ideological
Cleavages in Mass Environmental Attitudes, 17 SOC. Q. 477 (1976), Buttel & Flinn, The
Politics of Environmental Concern: The Impacts of Party Identification and PoliticalIdeology on Environmental Attitudes, 10 ENV. & BEH. 17 (1977); Dunlap, The Impact of
Political Orientation on EnvironmentalAttitudes and Actions, 7 ENV. & BEH. 428 (1975).
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While the elected officials of the Democratic Party tend to be
more pro-environment than their Republican counterparts, it is also
true that the Democratic Party cannot be too aggressive in its environmental advocacy lest it alienate its working class and non-white
supporters.' 0 Thus as the 1970s came to a close, it appears that the
"environmental decade" has failed to materialize, in the sense that
organized environmentalists often have avoided issues related to
resource depletion, and little progress has been made in addressing
the critical challenges of resource scarcity and survival. At a time in
which scarcities of finite, nonrenewable resources are becoming
imminent, the overall texture of United States energy policy, for
example, remains oriented largely toward supply expansion, rather
than conservation or substitution of renewable resources.1 1 Mainstream organized environmentalism in the 1970s typically was less
concerned with the long-range problems of energy and materials scarcity than with more cosmetic (although by no means trivial) issues of
land use planning, air and water pollution control, wilderness preservation, waste disposal, and the like.' 2
Once an environmental initiative is recognized politically, its
enactment may be expected to have different impacts on various
social groups. It is widely accepted that "meaningful" environmental
action would necessarily entail curbing economic growth (or at least
the energy- and materials-intensive growth that has characterized the
United States in the 20th century), and that those working in the
large-scale industrial sector would bear the immediate brunt of these
reforms.' ' Disruption of industrial growth and production would
mean lower profits, higher unemployment, and perhaps reduced
wages." Present strategies for environmental reform, then, precipitate and reinforce a very powerful coincidence of interest among
major corporate elites and the affluent working class in resisting such
reform. Groups least likely to be affected by reforms include elements of the "middle" or "upper-middle" socio-economic classes,
especially the professional, technical, academic, and administrative
10. Buttel & Flinn, supra note 9.
11. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY POLICY (J. Hammarlund and L. Lindberg eds. 1976); L. LINDBERG, THE ENERGY SYNDROME (1977); Walker & Large, The
Economics of Energy Extravagance, 4 ECOL. LAW Q. 963 (1975).
12. Schnaiberg, Politics, Participation,and Pollution: The "EnvironmentalMovement,"
in CITIES IN CHANGE (J. Walton and D. Carns eds. 1973); Sills, The Environmental
Movement and its Critics, 3 HUMAN ECOL. 1 (1975).
13. Morrison, Hornback & Warner, supra note 3; Morrison, supra note 3; Schnaiberg,
Social Syntheses of the Societal-Environmental Dialectic: The Role of DistributionalImpacts, 56 SOC. SCI. Q. 5 (1975).
14. Hardesty, The Political Economy of Environmental Destruction, in ECONOMIC
GROWTH VS. THE ENVIRONMENT (W. Johnson and J. Hardesty eds. 1971).
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categories.' I These groups generally are more insulated from the
consequences of environmental reform than are members of the
corporate and working classes, because of job security and employment in noncorporate and nonindustrial milieus. This accounts for
the strong over-representation of middle class persons in contemporary organized environmentalism.
The fact that our previous comments have focused primarily on
organized environmentalism and downplayed the role of public and
institutional environmentalism in many ways reflects the constraints
on environmental reform in the present liberal or centrist government structure that currently characterizes the United States. Environmentalism in the United States manifests the substantial gap
between a public that expresses rather strong pro-environmental sentiments (albeit from diverse bases in ideology and interest) and the
narrow social and membership bases of organized environmentalists.
This is because environmental agendas have never proven attractive as
campaign platforms in electoral politics. Hence, the major recourses
for the environmentally concerned are lobbying and court actionstrategies more amenable to organized environmentalists with high
levels of political and legal skill. The general image is one of organized environmentalists functioning as a pressure group to secure
environmentally favorable laws, and then using litigation to ensure
compliance with them. Correspondingly, coalitions with other groups
are made largely on an ad hoc basis.
In contrast, institutional environmentalism generally has been
reactive in character and aimed at mediating disputes between organized environmentalists and their adversaries. Institutionalized
environmentalism generally has been submerged within the broader
goals of the federal administrative apparatus (the current goals of
revitalizing the economy and reducing inflation).1 6 Thus environmentalism of the 1970s has been divided into its public, organized
interest group, and institutional components.
Nevertheless, in the sections that follow, we develop the argument
that the circumstances surrounding environmentalism of the 1970s
account only partially for the future course of environmentalism. As
much as existing struggles over environmental and energy policy are
"real," these conflicts would seem to lack the urgency and the "peak
association" 1 7 character that we may expect when, for example,
15. R. E. Dunlap, supra note 7; Buttel & Flinn, The Structure of Support for the
Environmental Movement, 1968-1970, 39 RURAL SOC. 56 (1974); Sills, supra note 12.
16. L. LINDBERG, supra note 11.
17. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, 16
WORLD POL. 677 (1964). The notion of "peak association" pertains to a situation in
which political groups are highly organized around and polarized over a major policy issue.
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prevailing scenarios for acute energy scarcity in the mid-i 980s come
to pass. In the next section we propose that the future of environmentalism cannot accurately be deduced from the characteristicsissue definitions, social and political bases, conflicting interests-of
the current form of environmentalism. In so doing, we offer a conceptual scheme designed to anticipate the possible forms that environmentalism might take in coming decades.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS:
A REFORMULATION

Our purpose in the present section is to elaborate a view of the
major structural components of an advanced society, in order to
indicate the interests most likely to be expressed by major participants in the environmental-political process. Table 1 provides a first
approximation of how the principal interests of four major structural
groups intersect with environmentalism over the short run and long
run. The specific referent for distinguishing between the short and
long run is the emergence of resource scarcity at some future point,
which undermines the traditional trajectory of exponential economic
growth.
Our major assumption is that resource scarcity will lead to change
in the constellations of interest among four structural groups. This
discussion will set the stage for our final substantive section, which
emphasizes how these new sets of interests may prompt changing
coalitions among the major structural groups and subgroups, as each
group seeks to defend or enhance its interests in a new era of scarcity.
We suggest that future patterns of environmentalism can be examined best by dissecting the social structure of an advanced society
into four key structural elements, and then drawing further distinctions within these elements. These four major components include
three social class categories-the capitalist/corporate class, the working class, and a structurally ambiguous "upper-middle class." The
final component is the state.
The capitalist/corporate class consists of those who own productive property (and who hold high-level management positions within
such enterprises), while the working class consists of persons primarily dependent on wage labor and who generally are excluded
from decision-making within the productive enterprise. This definition of the working class would include many persons often included
in the category of white-collar workers, e.g., most clerical and service
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workers and many salespeople. As Hamilton' 8 notes, the incomes,
living standards, work conditions, and political attitudes of such
white-collar persons, who have tenuous job security, lack orderly
careers, and have little decision-making power in work organizations,
are quite similar to those of the blue-collar working class.
The "upper-middle class" is structurally ambiguous vis-dt-vis the
two other major classes. We define this class as including those in
salaried employment in "mental," white-collar tasks-for example,
professional, technical, and middle-level managerial workers with
high levels of job security and orderly career progressions. The uppermiddle class (hereafter referred to as the middle class) shares certain
characteristics of the working class position in society (primarily lack
of productive property) while at the same time it is a materially
privileged class and its stability is based to some degree on resourceextravagant economic growth. In other words, the consumption and
employment status of the middle class may be imperiled if prevailing
patterns of production and capital accumulation are undermined.
However, as noted above, the middle class is generally pro-environmental and accounts for a highly disproportionate level of voluntary
environmental membership. The structural ambiguity of the middle
class, along with the possible contradiction involved in middle class
advocacy of environmental agendas that might undermine its consumption status, imply that middle class alliances with other groups
will be pivotal in shaping the strategies and ideologies of organized
environmentalism.
The final major structural element of the advanced societies is the
state apparatus. Following O'Connor and others,' 9 we posit that the
state has two principal functions: (1) ensuring the conditions for
profitable capital accumulation and economic growth, and (2) maintaining social harmony. These two functions are at least partly contradictory; policies that enhance or subsidize capital accumulation
(e.g., bailing out declining firms, providing investment tax credits to
encourage capital formation) disproportionately benefit owners of
productive property over those who do not own property. Moreover,
policies that subsidize capital accumulation typically lead to a capitalintensive form of accumulation, in which the capital invested in
industry yields relatively little additional employment, or which may
actually decrease employment through automation. The accumula18. R. HAMILTON, CLASS AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); R.
HAMILTON, RESTRAINING MYTHS (1975).
19. J. O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973); Offe, The Theory of
the CapitalistState and the Problem of Policy Formation, in STRESS AND CONTRADICTION IN MODERN CAPITALISM (L. Lindberg ed. 1975).
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tion function thus necessitates actions to secure legitimacy on the
part of groups marginalized by the increasing capital-intensive pattern of economic expansion (e.g., workers who lose their jobs because of automation), primarily through social welfare programs.
Table 1 also shows important differentiations within the categories
of the capitalist and working classes and the state. Galbraith and
O'Connor have emphasized that advanced economies have a dual
character by distinguishing between what we may term the monopoly and competitive sectors of the economy. 20 The monopoly sector
consists of a few hundred large, technologically advanced firms
which operate in imperfectly competitive markets. The persons who
work in the monopoly sector typically are unionized and make relatively high wages. The competitive sector, on the other hand, is
comprised of hundreds of thousands of relatively small, usually technologically stagnant firms in relatively competitive markets. Persons
who work for wages in the competitive sector generally are not
unionized and make relatively low incomes.
The most important rationale for distinguishing between the
monopoly and competitive sectors is the fact that government
growth policies tend to tilt heavily toward monopoly sector firms,
since their technological dynamism offers the greatest possibility for
maintaining a healthy, growing economy. 2 1 Monopoly sector
workers derive considerable benefits from the dynamism of the
monopoly sector. The competitive sector, on the other hand, has
much less potential for growth because technologically stagnant industries selling largely undifferentiated products have little capacity
for product innovation and expanded sales.
A final distinction we wish to make is between the "administrative" and "democratic" realms of the state-that is, between its
bureaucratic and parliamentary segments. The administrative
branches of the government are characterized by agencies in which
decision-making is depoliticized and insulated from popular electoral
influence. The democratic portion of the state consists of the electoral and parliamentary systems, where popular preferences (at least
in theory) are expressed. Many observers have noted the asendancy
of the administrative over the democratic sector of the government
as the span of state intervention in the economy has increased. Alford and Friedland have emphasized the increased prominence of the
administrative sector of the state and noted the deleterious consequences for groups such as public or organized environmentalists:
20. J. O'CONNOR, supra note 19; J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE
(1967).
21. J. O'CONNOR, supra note 19.
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The devolution of political power into autonomous bureaucratic
agencies has increased the penetration of specialized dominant interests into the state, facilitating the private control of public power in
a manner that has depoliticized decision-making and allocation and
has insulated it from partisan electoral controls. . . . The conse-

quence is a structural bias against large, heterogeneous social groups
with limited political resources. Fragmentation of policy making
encourages policies favorable to particularized
private interests
2
rather than socialized collective interests. 2
The significance of all of this is that widely held expressions of
environmental concern on the part of the public cannot survive the
democratic/electoral/parliamentary system and be translated into
effective environmental policy. At the same time, the more dominant
administrative sector of the government is insulated from these popular demands. This sector is also concerned with managing the private economy to secure the economic expansion both employers and
employees consider necessary.
In the short run, the environmental interests of the four segments
are much as contemporary environmental movement researchers have
identified them. Essentially, one sees a compelling coincidence of
interest in maximizing economic growth-and hence resource flowsamong the capitalist and working classes and the state. 2 3 The middle
class, on the other hand, is responsible for the major political support
for pro-environmental actions over the short run.
Our analysis, however, summarized in Table 1, suggests that the
emergence of energy and materials scarcity will produce changes in
the environmental interests of major social groups. Morrison 24 and
Schnaiberg, 2 s for example, have noted that insofar as resource scarcity undermines the traditional bases of economic expansion, one
may anticipate protracted struggles over the distribution of economic
resources. We also argue that the key axis of conflict over the long
term will be between the capitalist and working classes. These conflicts can be represented as disputes over the conditions in which
scarce natural resources are allocated to production and consumption
activities.
The interests of the capitalist-industrial class are best served if
scarce energy and materials are allocated to industrial production in
22. Alford & Friedland, Political Participationand Public Policy, 1 ANN. REV. SOC.
429 (1975).
23. Caldwell & Woolley, Energy Policy and the Capitalist State in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ENERGY POLICY (J. Hammarlund & L. Lindberg eds. 1976).
24. Morrison, supra note 3; Morrison, Growth, Environment, Equity and Scarcity, 57
SOC. SCI. Q. 292 (1976).
25. Schnaiberg, supra note 13.
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the traditional way (in which factors of production are combined in
centralized-usually factory-locations in order to sell commodities
from which profits can be derived). The working class, on the other
hand, is likely to favor social change in production and consumption
institutions, so the role of natural resources in the economy shifts
from production for private profit to production geared toward
social needs. Since unfettered economic expansion would be constrained by resource scarcity, the traditional channeling of materials
and energy to the production process would not produce the incremental increases in wages and employment that have prevailed in
previous eras of relative resource abundance. As a result, the working
class is increasingly interested in major institutional change. Examples of such shifts in resource allocation, production, and consumption institutions include public ownership of and control over
energy industries, localism in or decentralization of production, and
worker-controlled enterprises. In each case, the goal is to increase
labor's share of the social product by politically constraining the
allocation of scarce resources for private profit.
These emerging conflicts would be played out largely within the
state apparatus, and they ultimately could not be resolved by appealing to the major classes to cooperate in achieving economic growth
for mutual-albeit asymmetrical-benefit. The implication of an
economy of scarcity for social conflict is that the principal function
or interest of the government would shift from enhancing profitable
capital accumulation to maintaining social harmony. The precise role
of the state under these conditions is difficult to specify because of
its dual role noted above. Because the state does not own productive
property directly, it depends upon the capitalist-industrial class to
supply the material needs of the population; however, this class will
meet these needs only if it is privately profitable for them to do so.
Government officials thus will have to be concerned about maintaining business confidence so corporate owners will continue to invest
in the United States (rather than in other nations) and provide employment here.
But as noted above, resource scarcity, in limiting traditional solutions to social problems which emphasized the need for economic
growth, means the government faces an even greater potential crisis
of legitimacy as far as the working class is concerned. To minimize
conflict, the state must attempt to ensure support by groupsparticularly the poor and minorities-that bear the major costs of
production for private profit.2 6 These attempts could be made
26. Caldwell & Woolley, supra note 23.
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through social welfare expenditures, public employment programs,
etc. However, these steps conflict with the historic necessity of the
state to underwrite capital accumulation through government subsidies, highway construction, defense spending, and the like. Because
of the tension between these contradictory roles, the specific way in
which the conflict regulation or legitimation interests of the government are implemented will depend on the ways in which the environmental interests of other groups are expressed and on the types of
coalitions that develop.
The environmental interests of the middle class in times of resource scarcity are difficult to define. We noted earlier that the
middle class is structurally ambiguous because it shares certain material conditions of existence with both major social classes. The
important question concerning the future political-environmental
role of the middle class is whether it will continue to be a proenvironnental force, and what political direction its perceived interests will take. In Table 1 we note there may be two environmental
interests of the middle class when resources are scarce-maintaining
social status through, in part, continuity of its 1970s environmental
advocacy, and protecting consumption status if future environmental
politics threaten its material position.
Before discussing the rival political paths of environmentalism, it is
useful to emphasize that our division of society into four groups does
not necessarily imply a high level of harmony or unity of interest
within each. For example, it is certain that corporations in an economy of scarcity will compete with one another for political advantage within the government. Likewise, relatively privileged working
class groups, (i.e., monopoly sector labor) will attempt to maintain
their privilege vis-6-vis competitive sector labor, the poor, and the
unemployed. Thus, as is the case at present, conflicts within groups
are likely to develop. Nevertheless, the ultimate goals of each segment or group are likely to fall within the range of interests detailed
in Table 1, granting that group consciousness of common interests
will tend to be fleeting and transitory.
ENVIRONMENTALISM: RIGHT, CENTER, AND LEFT

Coalitionsand State Structures
We now come to the question of how shifting constellations of
environmental interests in a milieu of resource scarcity may yield
very different forms of environmentalism, because of their rooting in
state structures that we may label as right, center, and left. By state
structure, we refer to variations in the organization of the govern-
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mental apparatus as they relate to the coalitions of social groups
which hold state power. We noted earlier a similar analysis by Stretton, but Stretton's work, while provocative and insightful, is mostly
oriented toward the elaboration of the everyday details and group
consequences of each of the scenarios of environmentalism. Specifically, Stretton is vague on the social forces and group coalitions that
might produce change in the structure of the state apparatus and lead
to variations in the transition toward a sustainable or steady-state
society. In this section we wish to supplement Stretton's analysis by
indicating how shifting constellations of interests and group coalitions
might lead to each of the political-environmental paths he details.
The starting point for our analysis is the nature of coalitions between major structural groups, discussed in the previous section, in a
changing state organizational milieu in times of resource scarcity. We
begin by making several assumptions. First, the two major pivots for
coalitions of groups that shape different state structures are monopoly sector capital and monopoly sector labor. These two groups are
the most powerful sectors of capital and labor, respectively, and
those with positions most threatened by resource scarcity. These
groups also have the highest levels of internal organization and can
respond most rapidly to a changing political-environmental situation.
The second assumption is that while certain coalitions may be in
flux during a changing resource situation, capital and labor will continue to have the greatest ties to the administrative and democratic
spheres of the government, respectively. This is because those owning
capital are few in number and can achieve the greatest leverage over
policy within decentralized state bureaucracies which are insulated
from popular control. The working class, on the other hand, contains
more people and will have its greatest impact through democratic
process.
Table 2 indicates the most likely coalitions under the government
structures we label right, center, and left. It is well to begin with the
centrist or liberal type of state structure since it is virtually synonymous with the structure of the American (and most other Western)
government systems. The predominant group coalition in a centrist
state structure is between monopoly sector capital and monopoly
sector labor. Galbraith, O'Connor, and numerous other social scientists have noted that the historic bargains struck between monopoly
sector capital and monopoly sector labor have been the principal
non-government aspect of the rise of the liberal or centrist state.2 7
27. J. Galbraith, supra note 20; J. O'Connor, supra note 19. The first scholar to detect
the crucial importance of the coalition between large-scale capital and their affluent unionized working class employees was C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE NEW MEN OF POWER (1948).
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These bargains essentially amount to major unions agreeing to relinquish control over decision-making in the work place and curbing
resistance to automation, in exchange for relatively high wages and
job security. Industrial peace means capital can make rapid technological innovations in order to expand markets and increase productivity. At the same time, monopoly sector labor is able to expand
upon its living standard differentials relative to the competitive sector working class. At its most advanced level, the liberal state becomes a "corporatist" state; labor leaders become advisors to and
incorporated within administrative agencies so economic planning
oriented towards the needs of the monopoly sector can be implemented.
On the other hand, the democratic arm of the state suffers a
progressive reduction in influence. Furthermore, differentiation
between the working class in the monopoly and competitive sectors
remains high because of the monopoly capital/monopoly labor bargain. Therefore this class is divided and cannot speak with one voice
in the electoral process. So in the end, the democratic process yields
power to the more cohesive administrative sector.
There are two dominant group coalitions of a rightist state structure. The first is the link between monopoly sector capital and the
middle class, and the second is the coalition between monopoly sector and competitive sector labor. The coalition between monopoly
sector capital and the middle class, along with the alliance of monopoly sector capital and the administrative sector of the state, essentially fuses corporate and government decision-making structures.
Japan is the advanced society that most closely approximates the
rightist state structure. In Japan, for instance, there is a very close
identity of interest and purpose between owners of large corporations, government officials, and the middle class. 2 8 This leaves
monopoly sector labor with only one possible coalition-with competitive sector labor-in order to employ the democratic-parliamentary process to achieve common goals. A rightist state structure thus
potentially results in strong conflicts between the administrative and
democratic branches of the government, because each is influenced
by polarized class interests.
The leftist state structure also has two predominant coalitions.
The most important coalition is among monopoly sector labor, competitive sector labor, and the middle class. The second coalition is
between monopoly and competitive sector capital. The origin of a
leftist state structure usually will be electoral-it will result from
28. Kelley, Stunkel & Wescott, supra note S.
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support from the entire working class and the middle class in one or
a few social democratic or radical political parties. In defense of the
prerogatives of private ownership of productive property, competitive and monopoly sector capital thus are likely to enter a coalition,
to present a common voice within the administrative arm of the
government. Sweden is the advanced industrial society that most
clearly meets the criteria of the leftist state, although it retains very
strong elements of a centrist state structure. In particular, Sweden is
not characterized by either a strong middle and working class coalition or by the conflict between the administrative and democratic
sectors of the government expected in a more fully leftist state system.
Structure and Ideology in Three Paths of Environmentalism
Table 2 also presents likely ideologies of environmentalism that
would dominate under the three types of state structures just discussed. Environmentalism of the right would involve the view that
the state must assume centralized, relatively authoritarian control,
and that resource decisions should be made by a managerial elite
which understands sophisticated technology and complex ecological
processes. A further aspect of environmental ideology in a rightist
state structure would be that a sharp frugality and general decrease in
living standards for consumers are necessary to adapt to environmental/resource constraints.
Environmentalism of the center would continue the present environmental-ideological posture that conservation and environmental
control can be achieved largely through reduction of waste and wise
management, rather than through any drastic reduction in living standards; centrist environmental ideology also would continue to hold
that the government has primary responsibility for environmental
control and the state must balance competing demands made by
environmentalists, capital, and labor.
Environmentalism of the left would emphasize that a decentralized and egalitarian society is the most appropriate response to resource scarcity and environmental problems.2 9 Not only must the
29. One obvious question that arises here is why environmentalism of the left would tend
to embody a decentralist ideology, rather than the more centralist ideology that surrounds
resource management in, for example, the Soviet Union (Kelley, Stunkel & Wescott, supra
note 5). We feel this would be the case largely because a centralized left structure premised
on the pursuit of rapid growth would be as untenable as the centrist form of environmentalism froth which it presumably would develop. In other words, a decentralist strategy appears
to be the most promising way for a leftist coalition to offer a socially progressive alternative
to inequality and threats to consumption standards emerging in a milieu of resource scarcity.
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government regulate abuse of natural resources by owners of property, but it also must encourage new forms of production (e.g.,
worker-owned and/or worker-managed firms, community-based cooperatives, public enterprises) that enable broader participation of
the citizenry in decisions allocating natural resources.
Finally, we point out in Table 2 that the right, center, and left
state structures would have major influences on which of the three
elements of environmentalism-public, voluntary, and institutionalwould dominate environmental politics. The nature of the rightist
state-its major coalitions and the dominance of the administrative
sector of the government-would suggest a key role for institutional
environmentalism. As we will note in our discussion below, environmental policy in the rightist state would tend to be administered by a
stratum of government officials (ecological mandarins?) in the interest of their principal coalition partner, monopoly sector capital. We
would anticipate continued preeminence of organized, voluntary
environmentalism in the liberal, centrist state. And it appears that
the leftist state allows the greatest expression for public environmentalism because of the heightened importance of the electoral/
parliamentary sector.
Environmentalism of the center in some ways might be viewed as a
contradiction in terms. Environmentalism in a centrist government
must operate in the context of a continuing alliance between monopoly sector capital and labor. This yields a stratified system that is
non-distributive with respect to the fruits of growth (i.e., a constant
share of an increasing economic pie) and continued (albeit indirect)
domination of materials and environmental policy in government
agencies by the corporate-industrial class.
The basic political structure of environmentalism of the center is
the liberal democratic state and interest-group liberal politics. 3 Its
dominant ideological force is the cooperation of social classes and
groups to restore the growth trajectory characteristic of the bulk of
the post-World War II period. Both aspects of centrist environmentalism, as suggested earlier, would be quite vulnerable to a series of
economically crippling resource crises such as a protracted energy
shortage.
30. The notion of "interest group liberal" politics is taken from T. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM (1969). "Interest group liberalism" represents a state structure in which the
government plays a positive and expansive role (i.e., is "liberal," in the contemporary sense)
and the policy agenda (and ultimately the "public interest") is fashioned in terms of the
organized interest groups in society confronting a decentralized system of bureaucratic
agencies. See especially Lowi's comments on the limitations of interest group liberalism-in
particular, the tendency towards maintenance of structures of privilege and insulation of
state decision-making from popular control; Id. at 85-9 3.
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A fundamental problem of environmentalism of the centerbeyond its attention to only limited aspects of environmental problems-is the tendency of its environmental reform to harm disproportionately the subordinate classes. The generally inegalitarian nature
of environmental reform derives from two fundamental factors.
First, persistent divisions between the working class and environmentalists (due to the tendency for prevailing environmental reforms
to threaten working class economic security) result in environmental
initiatives that are insensitive to distributional impacts.
Second, the emphasis on restoring growth serves to limit environmental agendas to those which do not limit the profit-making-and
growth-producing-prerogatives of dominant industrial corporations. 3" Thus under prevailing interest-group liberalism, middle class
environmentalists remain one among many interest groups, which
itself is limited by its advocacy of measures that would harm-albeit
differentially-the two major social classes. Nevertheless, the stability
of centrist environmentalism, as noted above, requires the absence of
compelling, protracted resource or energy crises that would render its
limited scope of ecological reform impracticable for addressing these
crises. Centrist environmentalism and liberal democratic politics thus
probably will shift toward the right or the left as resource scarcity
emerges.
Environmentalism of the right would be shaped by the group
coalitions (especially of monopoly sector capital with the middle
class) that characterize its state structure. Government environmental
policies would tend to produce or aggravate levels of inequality between classes because of the fusion of corporate and state decisionmaking structures, and the likelihood that environmental policies
would be dictated substantially by and for dominant economic interests. Basically, this form of environmentalism would "solve" environmental problems by drastically reducing the living standards of the
working class, even through repression if necessary. In other words,
environmental problems are addressed in the interest of the dominant class and the middle class as depicted in Table 1.
This form of environmentalism has been argued to be possibleeven necessary-by several social scientists. Ophuls, for example,
stresses that:
Scarcity in general erodes the material basis for the relatively benign
individualistic and democratic politics of the modern industrial era;
31. Perhaps the prototypical exponent of the centrist model or political form of environmentalism is L. K. Caldwell. See especially L. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY (1970).
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ecological scarcity in particular seems to engender overwhelming
pressures toward political systems that are frankly authoritarian by

current standards, for there seems to be no other way to check
competitive overexploitation of resources and to assure competent
direction of a complex society's affairs in accord with steady-state
imperatives.3 2
He suggests two conditions that might give rise to environmentalism
of the right. The first is the active cooperation of the middle class
with the dominant class, as substantial numbers of the middle class
become mandarins who control scarce resources to the benefit of
major industrial corporations. Middle class allegiance with the corporate-industrial stratum also may serve to preserve the consumption
status of this class. Secondly, this form of environmentalism may
well result if accentuated energy or resource scarcity-particularly if
it emerges in the form of crippling shortages-undermines the ability
of the liberal state to regulate social conflict. 3
Environmentalism of the left is somewhat more difficult to depict
because it clearly does not exist in its pure form among present
advanced societies. As we noted earlier, Sweden probably meets its
criteria most closely. 3 4 Its fundamental characteristic would be that
environmental reform or measures that enhance ecological sustainability are consistent with socio-economic quality-that is, its constituent policies reduce class inequalities. Second, and flowing from
the first characteristic, these policies are dictated by and for working
class groups. Third, the left would see its interests as including environmental reform and sustainable resource policies. As we noted
above, the level of overt class conflict, especially within the state,
probably would be greater than in the centrist model of environmentalism, and its government officials even may be avowedly anticapitalist. Dominant political issues would revolve around the desirability and methods of restructuring the economy to facilitate a
system of production that benefits persons who do not own productive property-a decidedly difficult and risky activity in a capitalist
32. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 163 (1977).

33. This notion of environmentalism is frequently advocated or felt to be a necessity by
scholars such as Garrett Hardin and others who espouse the "lifeboat" ethic. See G. HARDIN, EXPLORING NEW ETHICS FOR SURVIVAL (1972); P. R. EHRLICH, HOW TO BE
A SURVIVOR (1971). Robert Heilbroner in his AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT (1974) also grudgingly accepts roughly this same scenario.
34. Schnaiberg, supra note 13; C. ANDERSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SURVIVAL

(1976); L. LINDBERG, supra note 11. Sweden, however, is relatively farther from the
ideal-type of a leftist state structure than Japan is from the rightist form. In particular,
Sweden has shown little movement toward decentralization of production and worker or
community ownership of productive property.
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economy . 3 Economic shifts that both decrease resource use and
increase employment 3 6 are implemented by government order; industries with investments supplanted by such a shift (especially the
automobile
industry) become increasingly defensive and politically
37
militant.
Although a transition toward environmentalism of the left would
not be smooth or blissful, this form of environmentalism could
achieve two goals largely unmet in the present social structure of the
United States: ecological sustainability and socio-economic equality.
What conditions might make a movement toward environmentalism

of the left more likely? Again, such a transition seems inconceivable
so long as resource and economic crises can be handled by prevailing

interest-group liberal politics; thus, the mutual exacerbation of resource crises (e.g., a severe energy crisis such as that envisioned by

many analysts during the mid-1980s) and continued erosion of the
ability of the United States economy to provide employment, rising
real incomes, and other material benefits well might be necessary but
by no means sufficient conditions favoring the transition to environ3
mentalism of the left. 8
However, the most crucial requisite is the combining of objectives
by labor, minorities, and other "underdogs," and middle class en-

vironmentalists. This would not be so much a matter of environmentalists coming to "understand" workers and their environmental
concerns, but more so one of workers and the left beginning to
understand how environmental problems and their material problems

have common roots. The failure of these two groups to reach these

35. R. MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1969).
36. Hannon, Energy, Labor, and the Conservor Society, 1977 TECH. REV. 47, has an
excellent discussion of sectoral shifts in the economy that would yield both energy conservation and higher levels of employment and well-being on the part of workers.
37. Visible proponents of the left path of environmentalism would include B. COMMONER, THE POVERTY OF POWER (1976); B. COMMONER, THE POLITICS OF ENERGY (1979). See also Deutsch, EnvironmentalPolitics-ParticipatoryStructures and Social
Change, in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CHANGE (Z. Milnar & H. Teune eds. 1978).
Certain environmental or environmentally-related organizations (e.g., Friends of the Earth,
Science for the People) and their publications (especially COEVOLUTION QUARTERLY)
are coming to be proponents of this point of view. See, e.g., Denman & Denman, Decentralization: Making Small Places Work Again, in PROGRESS AS IF SURVIVAL MATTERED
(H. Nash ed. 1977), which appears in a Friends of the Earth publication.
38. A related point is made in L. E. NULTY, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW INFLATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BASIC NECESSITIES (1977), published by the Exploratory Project for Economic Alternatives, Washington, D.C. This is another leading organization which seeks to identify strategies for implementing environmental policies in
socioeconomically progressive ways (i.e., so that working class persons and the poor are the
primary beneficiaries). Another related publication by this organization is R. APPLEGATE,
PUBLIC TRUSTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1976).
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understandings in turn may lead to the rightist state and its inegalitarian, authoritarian style of "environmental adaptation."
Some relevant developments with respect to the combination of
objectives by the working class and middle class environmentalists
are occurring within the loosely organized movements for alternative
or "soft" technology, worker-controlled industries, alternative agriculture, regional and community self-sufficiency, and the like. Many
of these strategies have derived from the work of Amory Lovins, 3 9
although he, himself, may not agree with the ways that these ideas
are employed in the present paper. This emphasizes that the unity of
purpose is tenuous for the members of these "alternatives" movements. Nevertheless, these movements indicate the possibility of
combining environmentalism with the needs of those near the bottom
of the present political-economic structure. 4 0 The success or failure
of these movements may be extremely important in determining
whether the fragility of liberal, growth politics in an age of abundance will yield to an environmentalism of the right or left in an era
of resource scarcity.
CONCLUSION
It is exceedingly difficult to step from the confines of one's
society in a specific place in history, to provide an analysis of future
paths of social change, especially in an era in which the material
bases of existing institutions are so tenuous. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that anticipating and shaping adjustments to declining resources
is important. The emergence of resource scarcity in the coming
decades likely will be a pivotal juncture for socio-political change in
the United States and kindred advanced societies. It is crucial to
recognize that this juncture may yield progressive or regressive social
changes; "[i] ndeed, the crisis of ecological scarcity might actually be
turned into a grand opportunity to build a more humane postindustrial society; the alternative is to let the shape of the steadystate paradigm be decided for us by accepting the outcome of current needs toward technocracy."''1 Anticipating the range of choices
that are available or possible may ideally enable those whose needs
are not adequately met by the present society to help construct a
more beneficient society over the coming decades.

39. A. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS (1976).
40. See also Schnaiberg, supra note 13.
41. W. OPHULS, supra note 32, at 164.

